I. INTRODUCTION
Should banks diversify their activities? Although few would readily deny that some diversification is necessary, banks seem to engage in a broad variety of activities. The question that arises is what is the optimal conglomeration of bank activities?
In this paper we focus on internal incentive problems that may arise from interactions between different divisions in a conglomerate bank. A drawback of combining bank activities is less transparency and therefore a reduction in the effectiveness of market discipline. Due to an increase in opaqueness of the bank's balance sheet outsiders cannot assess the performance of banks sufficiently, and more importantly, have little control over the bank, whereas bank managers may have excessive discretion. The absence of market discipline may result in free-rider problems, since each division does not fully internalize the consequences of its own actions.
The primary mechanism that we see for market discipline is its effect on the bank's cost of capital. Divisions should face a cost of capital reflecting the riskiness of their activities.
Conglomeration however obscures this process and invites cross-subsidization and free-riding. As a consequence, market discipline might become ineffective.
A recent example of free-riding (and cross-subsidization) was the Barings debâcle, where the costs of not inducing market discipline on the proprietary trading department turned out to be almost prohibitive. Some interpret this debâcle as a meltdown caused by a clash of cultures between proprietary trading activities and traditional banking, and suggest better internal controls and external supervision as remedies. In this paper we argue that while internal controls and supervision may indeed control incentives, they do however not align incentives, but merely 'brute force' desired behavior. In the Barings case market discipline was absent. Barings' corporate banking activities in the UK were effectively underwriting the risky proprietary trading activities in Singapore. Barings Singapore therefore faced an artificially low cost of capital and could free-ride on Barings UK.
These internal incentive problems have implications for the optimal organizational structure and scope of a bank's activities. While the internal incentives that we have discussed so far emphasize the cost of conglomeration, some distinct benefits exist as well. One argument in favor is that separate (market) financing of different activities may suffer from informational problems and adverse selection premiums elevating funding costs. Combining different divisions within a bank may lead to diversification benefits in funding ('washing out' of information 1 asymmetries); i.e. neutralizing information asymmetries by diversification may reduce a bank's funding costs. Thus diversification could reduce adverse selection (lemon's) premiums in the funding costs 1 . Another argument relates to the potentially distortive effects of limited liability.
As is well known, limited liability of shareholders may invite risk taking behavior (Jensen and Meckling [1976] ). Diversification through (implicit) analysis primarily incorporates the latter effect.
We will emphasize that explicitly considering co-insurance reduces these incentives. Our internal incentive problems and the potential mitigating effects of co-insurance bank's activities, and its optimal market discipline for stand-alone benefits of conglomeration. We conglomeration. In the extreme, have implications for the optimal organizational structure of a size. Our main insights are as follows. The effectiveness of activities (divisions) is of crucial importance for the potential find that effective market discipline pushes us away from with perfect or complete market discipline of stand-alone activities conglomeration (in absence of synergies) is never optimal. However, with ineffective market discipline conglomeration may or may not be beneficial. Since conglomeration further reduces market discipline, it is surprising that conglomeration might be beneficial; the diversification benefits of conglomeration (co-insurance) sometimes dominate the negative incentive effects. We also show that introducing internal cost of allocation schemes may create 'internal' market discipline that complements the weak external market discipline of the conglomerate. We will emphasize in this context that these schemes should be dynamic and thus should respond to actual risk choices.
The applicability of our analysis reaches further than the special case of Barings or multidivisional banking in general. The analysis transcends to a long-standing issue in industrial economics concerning the determinants of the boundaries of firms, as discussed in for example Grossman and Hart [1986] , Hart and Moore [1990] , Hart [1995] and Holmström and Tirole [1991] . This literature focuses -as we do-on the benefits and costs of integration and has implications for the optimal size of multi-divisional firms. Our paper contributes to this literature by explicitly trading off the costs and benefits of conglomeration in the absence of complementarily or joint production. We also provide a possible link between the type of a firm's assets and the firm's optimal scope and organizational structure. A related paper in this respect is Bagwell and Fulghieri [1995] , which finds conditions under which synergetic merging may improve divisional incentives and reduce the costs of internal agency. Furthermore our paper touches upon the issue of authority and delegation in organizations (see Aghion and Tirole [1994]) but then in the context of a multi-divisional firm.
Our analysis of cost of capital allocation schemes is related to recent studies that analyze the allocation of internally and externally raised capital to investment projects within a firm in the presence of information and incentive problems (see Harris and Raviv [1995] and Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein [1994] ). Whereas the availability of funds is the central focus of these papers, we emphasize the benefits of a mechanism for an internal allocation of cost of capital. We will expand on this in some detail (see Section VI). The point we make is that internal cost of capital allocations are of imminent importance in banking. Focusing on the allocation of capital and not on the cost of capital may induce distortions, and could actually explain why banks consider capital (prohibitively) expensive.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section II the general framework and intuition of our model is described. Section III introduces the model, and contains the analysis.
Here we derive the costs and benefits of conglomeration. The internal capital allocation mechanism is introduced in Section IV. In Section V we link our insights to the Barings debacle and focus on the interactions between relationship banking and proprietary trading activities.
Section VI adds some further perspective by linking our analysis to the overall cost of capital in banking. Section VII contains the conclusions. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
II. GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND INTUITION
We present a model in which external financing is potentially subjected to 'effective' market discipline. Market discipline is induced by introducing a direct link between (partially observable) risk choices and funding costs. The interest rate ( = funding cost) set by the market therefore does not only anticipate potentially more risky choices after contracting (the classic moral hazard), but does also partially respond directly to risk choices z . This implies that a firm cannot costlessly increase risk ex post. It would then immediately face an extra high interest rate.
This 'market discipline' response makes a firm reluctant to increase risk.
The approach taken in this paper is therefore more dynamic than the standard moral hazard approach. In the standard -static-moral hazard approach unobservable actions (e.g. risk and effort choices) are made after contract terms have been set. In that case the market will only anticipate the higher (than first best) risk choice and adjust contract terms accordingly. This however does not constrain moral hazard; to the contrary, moral hazard then becomes even more severe (i.e. the firm then faces even higher interest rates and will make even more sub-optimal risk choices). Unless the firm can somehow try to commit to safer choices to prevent these adverse contract terms, we seem always driven to the worst situation. Therefore we have introduced effective market discipline by having the interest rate charged to the firm reflect both (partially observable) actual and anticipated risk choices. Since the firm now bears some of the additional costs from suboptimal risk taking it may be discouraged to do so.
A second feature of our model is the free-riding due to a 'moral hazard in teams' effect (Holmström [1982] ). This is introduced by incorporating separate divisions in a multi-divisional bank. In this case diversification benefits (in funding costs) may be realized since the separate divisions actually co-insure each other. However, in the absence of an internal cost of capital allocation the funding cost of each division only partially reflects the risk choices made by that division. That is, the consequences of each division's decisions are shared by all, since the market only assesses the overall riskiness of the bank. As a consequence divisions can increase risks without being fully charged for the costs, even if external market discipline is perfect. Thus even for an arbitrarily high degree of market discipline divisions may choose to free-ride on the bank at large.
The intuition developed in the paper is as follows. We consider two divisions, A and B, that need to be financed externally and may either operate as stand-alone firms or may be integrated in a two-divisional bank. Division A makes a (partially observable and/or verifiable) risk choice whereas in division B no incentive problems are present. If operated as a stand-alone firm, division A faces market discipline that counters adverse risk taking incentives; the market charges an interest rate reflecting actual risk choices. The degree of market discipline imposed determines the sensitivity of division A's funding costs with respect to its risk taking behavior.
Higher levels of market discipline mitigate division A's incentive problems and drive its risk choices toward first best.
If the two divisions are integrated in one bank, the pooled funding cost reflects only partially the risk choices of each division; both divisions 'share' the consequences of their choices.
Simultaneously the divisions co-insure each other, i.e. the multi-divisional bank's returns are more predictable and ceteris paribus default is less likely. This has three consequences. First, the coinsurance lowers the pooled funding rate, and hence reduces risk-taking incentives induced by limited liability. We label this the diversification effect of co-insurance. This effect alone will improve division A's risk choices. Second, the default probability of the bank becomes partially immune to (excessive) risk taking by division A. This reduces the expected costs of financial distress, thus inducing risk taking (negative incentive-effect of co-insurance). Third, since the sensitivity of the pooled funding rate with respect to division A's risk choice is lower than with separate financing, market discipline becomes less effective. Division A now only partially internalizes the higher funding costs associated become less effective inducing extra inefficiencies incentive effect of reduced market discipline).
with risk taking. Thus market discipline has (free-riding) in division A's decisions (negative These considerations highlight that -even ignoring the internal allocation of cost of capitalthe diversification benefits might be such that conglomeration is optimal. Diversification ceteris paribus reduces (nominal) funding rates and as such improves incentives. Note however that in the case of 'complete' or perfect market discipline of stand-alone activities the adverse incentives associated with limited liability are fully mitigated. In that case diversification has no value and the negative incentive effects of conglomeration always dominate. Our analysis therefore points at the importance of market discipline. The general result is that perfect market discipline of standalone activities pushes us away from conglomeration, and imperfect market discipline could make conglomeration optimal. The latter result holds notwithstanding that conglomeration will always further reduce market discipline. Surprisingly therefore our analysis shows that conglomeration might have benefits that 'replace' ineffective market discipline even in the absence of internal cost of capital allocations or other internal control mechanisms. Alternatively, however, conglomeration might make matters worse. Only when the diversification effect is strong enough could conglomeration improve on the operations of stand-alone divisions. The benefits of conglomeration could be improved further by introducing an internal scheme for the allocation of costs of capital. This mechanism could be designed such that it complements the (external) market discipline. It enhances the sensitivity of the funding costs of each division, such that free-rider problems are mitigated.
III. THE BASIC MODEL; SETUP AND ANALYSIS
A. Specification
A. 1 Production Possibilities for Divisions/Firms
The model is a one-period model with universal risk neutrality. The riskless interest rate is assumed to be zero. Consider two divisions, division A and division B. Each needs to raise $1 for its investment opportunities. All funding is raised through debt contracts. The future opportunities of division A are aggregated in the parameter F. F represents the capitalized future profits of division A, incorporating all expected cash flows from the periods beyond t=1 4 . In case of default division A is assumed to terminate and F will be lost. Note that this F introduces benefits of co-insurance in our analysis.
and O with a probability ( l-p B ). The correlation between the project returns (or, more precisely,
A.2 Organizational Structure
We distinguish two organizational structures:
(1) Both division A and division B operate separately and independently (stand-alone option).
Each is funded directly in competitive credit markets. The funding costs of division A and B are R A and R B respectively.
(2) Division A and division B are integrated in one firm. The funding costs of the twodivisional firm then are given by R 0 .
We assume that the two-divisional firm will only default if the projects of both divisions fail. This incorporates co-insurance in the model 6 .
The sequence of events in the game is as follows. At t=0 the organizational structure of the firm is determined and the divisions' activities are funded. Then both divisions invest their $1.
The manager of division A chooses the monitoring intensity (thus the level of risk). At t= 1 cash
This will be discussed in more detail in Section VI.
flows are realized and repayments are made. Then the game ends.
A.3. Determination of Interest Rates and Market Discipline
In the absence of (some form of) market discipline the manager of division A makes his risk choice after the contract terms have been set. Since financial market participants have rational expectations the division A manager's incentive to underinvest in effort to control risk will be anticipated and incorporated in the contract terms. Because capital markets are assumed to be competitive the funding costs R A , R B and R 0 (expressed as interest factors) are set to yield the lenders zero profits and satisfy
This reflects the co-insurance, and creates the diversification effect.
Effective market discipline limits division A's ability to manipulate m; i.e. in the presence of market discipline division A cannot costlessly reduce monitoring to increase risk. Market discipline is incorporated in the model by assuming that R A and R 0 partially reflect the actual monitoring choice directly. This is possible because the division's risk choice is partially observable and verifiable'. The degree of market discipline imposed is denoted by a parameter market discipline. In the presence of market discipline the choice of m has a direct effect on R.
introducing a direct effect of the choice of m on the division's funding costs in the first order condition. Let 7 Note that for reasons of interpretation here a possible link could be provided between the type (and represents the degree of contractibility/verifiability of effort levels chosen in the division (interpretation market discipline in terms of 'transparency'). This will be elaborated upon in future versions of the paper.
7 the degree of market discipline.
B. Analysis
Since the success probability of the project of division B is actions, the analysis will proceed from the perspective of division manager's choice of monitoring intensity,
B.1 Risk Choice in a Stand-Alone Firm
independent of its manager's A. We start with division A
In the presence of market discipline the manager of a stand-alone division A solves the following optimization problem:
With complete selffinancing the first best level of monitoring intensity m* chosen by the monitoring chosen follows from the first order condition of (4), taking into account (A-1),
The following results can now be derived.
level of market discipline imposed and reaches the first best risk choice ( =monitoring with the intensity The intuition is as follows. Lemma 1 shows the discrepancy between the first best and the actual level of monitoring chosen. In absence of market discipline the financial market can only discipline mitigates moral hazard by creating a mechanism for ex post settling up, i.e. by directly confronting the divisional manager with an increase in interest rate following his (lower) monitoring decision. This will make the manager more reluctant to deviate from the optimal effort decision and first best obtains.
B.2 Risk Choice in a Conglomerate
If division A and division B are integrated in a two-divisional firm, the manager of division A determines his monitoring choice by solving the following optimization problem:
Note that the future rents F are available to division A even if division A fails, as long as division order condition for division A can be expressed as follows:
Note that we have rearranged the terms in (7) to disentangle the various effects that differentiate the conglomerate from the stand-alone case. We first derive the following result.
Lemma 3: Since the impact of market discipline on division A is lower in a two-divisional firm than in a stand-alone firm.
The intuition is that since in a multi-divisional firm the consequences of division A's moral hazard are shared by both divisions, division A is only partially confronted with its discipline will be less effective in a conglomerate, even if outsiders can detect monitoring choices of each division as easily in the conglomerate as in the stand-alone case.
We can now interpret equation (7). Comparing (5) to (7) identifies the three effects that distinguish the two-divisional firm from the stand-alone division. The first two terms on the LHS of equation (7) refer to the marginal return to effort of division A as a stand-alone firm (as can be found in (5) as well). Conglomeration introduces three different effects:
First, a diversification effect of co-insurance, represented in the third term on the LHS of two-divisional firm, and positively affects division A's choice of monitoring;
Second, an incentive effect of co-insurance, represented in the fourth term on the LHS of (7). This co-insurance effect guarantees that division A may capture its future rents F even if it fails. This occurs whenever division B is successful. Division A therefore can freeride on division B in a two-divisional firm. This effect makes more risk (less monitoring) acceptable to division A;
Third, an incentive effect due to a reduction in the impact of external market discipline, represented in the fifth term on the LHS of equation (7). This induces additional freeriding and adds to the negative incentive effect from co-insurance; this adversely affects division A's choice of monitoring.
The leads to the following two results.
intensity chosen by division A is higher ( = lower risk) in an integrated (conglomerate) firm than in The intuition is straightforward.
attains first best risk choices and is therefore always (Near) perfect market discipline does not leave much value to conglomeration. That is, in the extreme -with perfect market discipline-incentives are fully aligned and conglomeration could only make matters worse. At the other extreme, with no market discipline, the prospects for conglomeration are best, resulting in a large interval of values of F for which conglomeration is optimal.
B.3 Choice of Organizational Structure
Division A chooses an organizational structure that maximizes its expected payoff. This decision is made prior to the monitoring decision at t =0. The following result can be derived.
The intuition is as follows. Note first that a stand-alone division A would benefit from committing to a higher monitoring intensity (see Lemma 1). However, since the monitoring choice a different organizational structure (conglomeration) may improve the privately optimal monitoring choice. This is the case if division A can benefit from the diversification effects of co-insurance in a conglomerate. We have seen that for relatively low values of capitalized future profits F division A will increase its monitoring intensity in a conglomerate (see Proposition 1).
co-insurance dominates and division A chooses a lower monitoring intensity if incorporated in a conglomerate (Proposition 1). Conglomeration then still may be optimal since the net gain from diversification (co-insurance) may exceed the net loss due to distorted incentives to control its division A then will be distorted so much that the co-insurance effect will be completely eliminated. No increase in F can make conglomeration desirable anymore, since the probability of capturing these higher rents has deteriorated sufficient y. As we now show an internal allocation of cost of capital could enlarge the set of circumstances where conglomeration is optimal. conglomeration. An increase in the impact of market discipline in a conglomerate firm therefore could reduce free-riding and facilitate socially desirable integration.
IV. INTERNAL ALLOCATION OF COST OF CAPITAL
In this section we show that an internal cost of capital allocation mechanism could create internal discipline that complements (external) market discipline. Such a well-functioning (internal) cost of capital allocation mechanism could align incentives and allow division A to optimally benefit from the diversification benefit of integration.
The sequence of events now will be as follows. At t =0 the organizational structure of the firm is determined, the firm is funded and in case of a two-divisional firm the CEO allocates (cost of) capital to the respective divisions. The manager of division A chooses its risk level and both divisions make their investment decisions. At t= 1 cash flows are realized and repayments are division A's choice of monitoring can be increased by an internal allocation of (the cost of) capital to the respective divisions by a CEO, who is either potentially better informed with respect to the incentive problems in division A than outsiders or could just undo the diluted market discipline in a conglomerate 9 .
was charged to each division; this is now going to change. The internal allocation of cost of capital is introduced in the following way. The CEO first allocates a differential charge to the respective divisions to reflect intrinsic differences in riskiness, i.e. the CEO does not charge a pooled rate to both divisions but differentiates the cost of capital charged between division A and division B. This is analogous to charging the cost of capital which would be charged by the market if division A and division B would be operated and funded as separate entities.
Simultaneously, the CEO could restore market discipline by increasing the sensitivity parameter in the cost of capital charged to division A with respect to m. That is, he internally 'leverages' the Note that the differential charge that is now imposed removes the diversification benefit 9 It is not necessary that the CEO is better informed than outsiders. If he were equally informed, and could only undo the diluted impact of market discipline on division A by using an internal cost of capital allocation, things would improve as well. In this case the total degree of (market) discipline that division A than outsiders the total (market) discipline could become even larger, sensitivity vis-a-vis the funding cost of the division as stand-alone entity.
13 from the (nominal) funding costs. Each division will now be charged for its default risk. This implies that both divisions will face a higher (nominal) funding cost than before. The following result can be derived.
Lemma 4: A differential charge reflecting intrinsic differences in riskiness will elevate the (nominal) funding cost faced by both divisions. This will worsen division A's incentives.
The intuition for this lemma is that passively increasing capital charges worsens incentives.
It highlights the adverse outcomes that occur with classic moral hazard. An internal cost of capital
conglomerate, enlarging the range of values of F for which conglomeration is optimal; that is (see
The result in Proposition 3 shows the potential effectiveness of internal discipline.
Effectiveness requires a dynamic mechanism that responds
This discipline adds to the optimality of conglomeration, and costs of the conglomerate bank.
continuously to actual risk choices.
will subsequently reduce the funding attains; division A chooses its first best risk level.
A can be reduced by a well functioning internal cost of capital allocation mechanism and thus promote socially desirable conglomeration.
V. PROPRIETARY TRADING: THE BARINGS CASE

A. Introduction
In this section we adapt our analysis to the specific features of the Barings debâcle as 14 briefly discussed in the Introduction. In this extension we address the issue of the optimal organizational structure of proprietary trading activities in banking and how it may undermine other activities.
We will argue that the proprietary trading activity free-rides on the bank at large. This, we will show, has three consequences; (i) proprietary trading appears more profitable than it really is; (ii) a proprietary trading unit does not sufficiently internalize risks; and (iii) other (mainly relationship-oriented) activities of banks may face an unfairly high cost of funds. The implication might be that bankers mistakenly believe that proprietary trading is profitable, while simultaneously undermining their relationship-oriented activities.
Note that much of the banking activities are relationship-oriented. Proprietary trading activities however are different and involve arbitrage between different markets and/or different financial products. These trading activities involve substantial risk, thus establishing the fair riskadjusted cost of funds is important. This cost might, given the specific nature of the trading activities, differ substantially from the cost of funds of the bank as a whole. Moreover, relationship-oriented banking by definition has a longer-term scope; the bank may need to heavily invest in relationships at the outset (a 'set-up' cost), in order to benefit in the longer term. An interaction therefore can be expected between relationship-specific effort exerted now and the possibility to benefit from this in a later period. The activities in the trading division are more short-term oriented and do not depend on relationship-specific effort. In a multi-divisional bank however the risk choices of the trading division may have an impact on the relationship-banking division, by affecting the risk -and survival probability-of the bank as a whole.
In our stylized framework, we thus envision two effects of proprietary trading on the relationship banking activities: proprietary trading may impact the overall funding costs and the survival probability. Compared to our model setup so far we now activate division B as
proprietary trading division, and we interpret division A as the relationship-banking division. Our primary focus is on how the choices of division B may worsen the operations of, and choices made by division A.
B. Specification and Analysis
As before, division A (the relationship-banking activity) chooses monitoring intensity m some of the future benefits of relationship-specific investments and generalizes the exogenous value of F as used before.
Our primary focus is on division B (the proprietary trading activity). This division
Analogous to the main analysis in Section III two different organizational structures can be distinguished; either stand-alone or conglomerate. The funding costs are as specified in (1) choices if it operates stand alone and in a conglomerate respectively. We can now derive the following result.
The proposition shows that effective market discipline (of stand-alone activities) discourages conglomeration. Conglomeration undermines market discipline and induces free-riding. On the the beneficial effects of diversification dominate, and conglomeration becomes optimal.
Proposition 4 is in the spirit of our earlier results.
But even if it is optimal for division B to be part of a conglomerate with the relationshipbanking division A, is it optimal for division A? We can show: Note that in the assumptions underlying Proposition 4 and 5 we may have underestimated the consequences of risk taking in the proprietary trading division B. We assumed that division A defaults less often as part of a conglomerate bank than as a stand-alone entity. We next allow the proprietary trading division B to increase the default probability of the bank as a whole.
success probability of the relationship lending division A. We assume that default in the proprietary trading division reduces the success probability of the relationship lending division the respective divisions' risk choices in a conglomerate bank.
Corollary 3: (preliminary)
The incentives for (excessive) risk taking in both divisions of the conglomerate bank increase with case the total value of the conglomerate may be less than the sum of the values of the stand-alone divisions.
For a summary of all the possible combinations of risk choices and choices of organizational structure see the proof of Proposition 5.
12 Note that here we focus on a one-sided impact of division B's risk taking incentives on the success probability of division A. This is done for reasons of (economic) interpretation and simplicity. Introducing a two-sided impact ('correlation') would not qualitatively change our results. Note furthermore that there may be different ways to model the impact of excessive risk taking by proprietary trading on the relationship banking division, e.g. by decreasing the capitalized value of future rents F(m) with some factor. The difference between this option and our choice lies in the extent to which the relationship lending department will be able to capture the current cash flow X. Our approach therefore is a bit more strict, since default in the proprietary division will lower both the probability that the relationship lending division will incur X and the expected capitalized value of future profits. Still another way of incorporating a dilution factor would be The intuition of Corollary 3 is that the possible dissipative impact of default in division B proprietary trading department then undermines relationship banking activities (i.e. reduces monitoring intensity in division A) even more and further reduces the benefits of conglomeration to division A 13 , Proposition 4 and 5 and Corollary 3 together give us some key implications of the Barings debâcle. Proprietary trading within a conglomerate bank may suffer from a lack of market discipline, and as a result, excessive risk taking may occur that undermines the relationshipspecific activities. The latter effect is the key insight that this section adds to our general analysis in Section III.
VI. APPLICATION: COST OF CAPITAL IN BANKING
An important issue is the cost of capital in banking. It seems a fact of life that banks consider capital very expensive, and therefore want to use their capital as efficiently as possible.
In practice, bankers will tell you that capital costs say 15%, while debt (deposits) will not even cost half of that. In their minds capital has this fixed high price. It is therefore not surprising that they will choose to utilize this expensive capital as efficiently as possible. The problem with this line of reasoning is that capital does not have one price; the cost of capital is determined by the risks this capital is exposed to.
This puzzle may have a straightforward resolution. The bankers' beliefs in expensive and fixed price equity may create a self-fulfilling prophecy. The market knows that banks will put to use any unit of idle capital (not using it, given the high fixed price is a waste!), and therefore the market anticipates that any capital granted to a bank will be exposed to substantial risks. As a matter of fact, matters might even be worse. Banks will seek to put to use idle capital rapidly which elevates risk even more. These beliefs and anticipations create a perverse equilibrium.
Given the bankers state of mind -fixed priced, expensive capital that needs to be put to use as quickly as possible-the market responds rationally by charging a higher price for capital. And given these anticipations by the market, the bankers' beliefs are justified and confirmed in equilibrium.
Our analysis has something to say about this important issue. The belief in a fixed price for capital ignores the potential corrections imposed by market discipline. In particular, we have emphasized that effective market discipline is present if the cost of funds responds to actual risk choices. The perverse equilibrium that is rooted in self-fulfilling beliefs is particularly relevant for opaque (conglomerate) banking institutions. The market can then not sufficiently observe actual risk choices and therefore acts on what it anticipates the banks might do. In more transparent institutions, funding costs are better linked to actual risk choices, and less dependent on the potentially 'demoralizing' indirect inferences (via the self-fulfilling beliefs of bankers and market). Now banks could be more readily rewarded for good behavior. In other words, market discipline might then work. This could 'break' the perverse equilibrium.
In the preceeding/previous sections we have analyzed the trade-off between conglomeration and the more transparent stand-alone option. We have shown that conglomeration would sometimes lower the overall cost of funding despite dilution in market discipline. The reasoning in this section shows that self-fulfilling (perverse) beliefs may aggregate the consequences of diluted market discipline. This may further elevate the importance of internal cost of capital allocation mechanisms.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have focused on the incentives for risk taking in a multi-divisional ('conglomerate') bank. Incentive problems sometimes dictate integration of activities, but with perfect market discipline always favor stand-alone activities. Conglomeration might have benefits that 'replace' ineffective market discipline. In particular, the augmented diversification may effectively relax the limited liability constraint such that adverse incentives are mitigated. Typically however, we show that conglomeration will undermine market discipline and invite free-riding. An effective internal capital cost allocation mechanism might then be indispensable to mitigate these effects.
Two developments might be of direct importance for our analysis. First, in the recent decennia we have observed substantial advances in information technology and an ever increasing sophistication of financial markets. These developments suggest that market discipline has improved over time. Together with our finding that more market discipline pushes us in the direction of stand-alone activities, conglomeration should suffer. Second, the environment (for banks and other firms) has generally become more competitive. Our findings suggest that this (a lower F in our analysis) may actually favor conglomeration. These developments therefore do not unambiguously point at conglomeration or separation of activities. However, we do show that ultimately market discipline is a decisive factor (favoring separation).
Proof of Proposition 3:
In the presence of internal discipline the first order condition of division A's optimization problem is given by (A.1O) by r given in Proposition 1) as the cutoff level of the absence of internal discipline, it can F corresponding with easily be seen that that the presence of allocation mechanism based on both a differential charge and internal discipline is preferred over u Proof of Corollary subjected to equals 1
Proof of Proposition
The result then follows readily from Lemma 2. u Table A 
